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Abstract 
 
Already in the 1930ies psychologists mentioned the tendency of people to see the self as the center of 
social judgment. This leads to egocentrically biased judgments when assessing others’ behavior. 
Since the first demonstration of this social projection bias in a study by Ross, Greene, and House (1977) 
a lot of studies followed. They show the effect in different contexts and the false consensus effect be-
came a widely accepted phenomenon. 
In this paper we analyze the false consensus effect in a financial context. In two studies, we use simple 
lottery questions and ask subjects to state certainty equivalents for the own person and also to predict 
the average certainty equivalent of other participants. We find a strong correlation between the own 
judgment and the prediction of others’ judgments. As we use 50/50-lotteries and in addition ambiguous 
probabilities in our studies, we extend the scope of Gilovich (1990) to financial decisions. The false 
consensus effect is stronger in situations with ambiguity. We also asked participants to give an interval 
for the certainty equivalents, i.e. a lower bound that they think is not fallen short by more than 5 % of 
the participants and also an upper bound which is not exceeded by more than 5 %. We find that people 
strongly underestimate the variation in others’ risk preferences. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In the 1930ies psychologists mentioned the tendency of people to see the self as the center of 
social judgment. This leads to egocentrically biased judgments when people are asked to pre-
dict the behavior of other people. Ross, Greene, and House (1977) were the first to demon-
strate this social projection bias. They find an overall tendency of people to overestimate one's 
similarity to attitudes, behaviors, and personality traits of other person. People readily think 
their own opinions, beliefs and predictions to be more prevalent in the general public than 
they really are. To show this “false consensus effect” Ross, Greene, and House used hypo-
thetical questionnaire studies and they also confronted subjects with real conflict situations. 
For example, students were asked to carry a sandwich board sign saying “Eat at Joe’s” and 
should predict how many of their fellows would accept or refuse to carry the board.. They 
find evidence for a false consensus effect in hypothetical questionnaires as well as in real con-
flict situations. People see their own behavioral choices and judgments as relatively common 
and appropriate to a specific situation while alternative responses are considered to be un-
common, deviant and inappropriate. In various follow-up studies Ross et al. find the false 
consensus effect to be especially strong in political expectations, personal traits and views and 
personal problems. 
After 1977 a lot of other studies followed showing the false consensus effect in different con-
texts and it became a widely accepted phenomenon. Mullen et al. (1985) employ a meta-
analysis of 115 hypothesis tests. Their results show that the false consensus is a very stable 
effect. It could be demonstrated in behaviors, e.g. people watching TV or playing tennis think 
this behavior is more common than people with other hobbies, in decisions (e.g. eating ham or 
egg for breakfast, painting a room blue or yellow), in opinions (e.g. political statements, 
women’s rights). Moreover the effect was found in evaluations (e.g. thinking to die before the 
age of 70, thinking to be better off in later life than the own parents) and also in characteristics 
(e.g. shy people think this characteristic is more widespread than it actually is). 
Marks and Miller (1987) present an empirical and theoretical review of ten years of research 
on the false consensus effect. Their goal was to summarize possible explanations for the ef-
fect. Therefore they present four general theoretical perspectives. The first perspective ex-
plains the bias with a selective exposure of similar others. People associate with other people 
who are similar rather than dissimilar to themselves. This leads to a biased and restricted 
sample of information. The second explanatory approach stresses salience and focus of atten-
tion. People tend to put their focus of attention on their preferred position and this act of en-
 3
gaging makes the position to be more salient than it really might be. The third approach em-
phasizes the tendency of people to attribute the cause of their own behavior to situational (in 
contrast to dispositional) forces. Thus, they conclude others to behave alike in similar con-
texts. Finally, the fourth explanation assumes a motivational explanation. The overestimation 
of similarity between the own and other persons may have a functional value, e.g. to maintain 
self-esteem. Marks and Miller were not able to identify one approach that causes the effect 
but they find evidence for each of the four theoretical perspectives. 
Several studies attribute the false consensus bias to an insufficient adjustment form the anchor 
of th own perspective.1. They suggest that people adopt others’ perspectives by using their 
own perspective as an initial anchor and subsequently adjust for differences between them-
selves and others.2 As these adjustments tend to be insufficient they give rise to egocentric 
bias. 
Gilovich (1990) shows that the false consensus effect is higher in situation with a greater lati-
tude for subjective construal. Divergence of opinion can not only stem from differences in the 
“judgment of the object” but may also be due to differences in the “object of judgment”. For 
example, the question “Are you competitive?” allows a higher diversity in interpretation com-
pared to “Are you a first-born or a later-born child?”. Gilovich studies the different issues 
originally reported in Ross, Greene, and House (1977) and finds a positive correlation be-
tween latitude for construal and the size of the false consensus effect. Moreover he performs a 
study where two versions of the same choice problem were given to subjects, one a more 
specified version of the other. The participants who are asked to choose and to give a consen-
sus estimate between aqua and tan, for example, exhibit a higher effect than those who decide 
between two specific swatches of two colors. 
 
Despite the high number of studies analyzing the false consensus effect there is up to our 
knowledge little about the effect in financial decisions. 
Hsee and Weber (1997) find a general prediction error in predictions of others’ risky choices. 
They used 50/50-lotteries and participants had to chose between the lotteries and sure options 
and in addition they had to predict the choice concerning the same lottery of another subject. 
The other subject was described in three different ways: as the average American, the average 
student on campus and as the person sitting next to the participant in the classroom. Hsee and 
Weber find that the risk preference of the average American and the average student on cam-
pus is overestimated in the sense that the prediction is not risk averse enough. This prediction 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Gilovich et al. (1998, 2000), Nickerson (1999) or Epley et al. (2004). 
2 See Tversky/Kahnemann (1974) for a description of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. 
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error vanishes if the other person becomes very concrete, i.e. if participants are asked to pre-
dict the preferences of the person sitting next to them in the room. In this situation there is no 
overall prediction error. 
In an experiment by Engelmann and Stroebel (2004) subjects had to choose whether all four 
members in their group play a lottery or not and at the same time estimate how many of the 
subjects in other groups would chose to play the lottery. They find that without any additional 
information the false consensus effect appears. If information about choices in the own group 
is explicitly provided, the false consensus effect disappears in the estimation of the other 
groups. However if the information about the own group is only implicitly provided (in form 
of payoffs for subjects) the false consensus effect in predicting other groups’ behavior again 
reappears. 
Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) did another study of the accuracy of people’s predictions of 
others’ risky choices. Like Hsee and Weber they use financial lottery questions but with dif-
ferent probabilities to construct choices in which people typically choose more risk averse or 
more risk seeking. On the basis of the fourfold pattern of Tversky and Kahneman (1986) they 
expected risk seeking for a lottery with a small winning probability (0.001) in the gain domain 
and risk aversion for a high probability (0.99). In the domain of losses they expected risk 
aversion for the small probability prospect and risk seeking for the large probability loss. In the 
prediction condition participants are asked to indicate the certainty equivalent of a randomly 
selected University of Chicago MBA student. They detect a systematic inaccuracy, the predic-
tions of others’ choices are too regressive, meaning that predicted certainty equivalents are 
closer to risk neutrality than they actually are. When people tend to be risk seeking in a situa-
tion, they also predict that others are risk seeking but substantially less so. Vice versa, when 
they tend to be risk averse the prediction of others is less risk averse. 
Roszkowski and Grable (2005) study real financial advisors’ estimates of risk tolerance of 
their clients. Advisors were graduates of The American College‘s Master‘s in Financial Ser-
vices program. Each advisor was asked to pick two of his clients and all answered a risk toler-
ance questionnaire developed by the college. Own risk tolerance was measured on a seven-
point scale and the client‘s risk tolerance was measured on a ten-point scale. They do not find 
a positive correlation between own risk tolerance and estimated risk tolerance of the clients. 
 
With this paper we want to contribute to the literature dealing with the predictions of others’ 
risky choices in financial decisions. We are interested in the prediction for a representative 
(average) individual. This task is quite common in reality. A fund manager has to decide on 
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behalf of many investors. A bank has to decide about the variety of offered products. A doctor 
has to think about the best risky medical treatment for the average patient. 
In accordance to Hsee/Weber and Faro/Rottenstreich we hypothesize to find an overall pre-
diction bias in the sense that people overestimate the risk tolerance of others. As we analyze 
lotteries in the gain domain we expect risk averse decisions for the own person. We hypothe-
size to find a prediction error in the sense that we expect inadequate high certainty equivalents 
when participants are asked to predict others’ preferences. In addition to former studies, we 
also use ambiguous probabilities, thus we extend the scope of Gilovich (1990) to financial 
decisions. Ambiguity is omnipresent in financial decisions, think of the future development of 
a stock price. Predicting behavior for decision making under ambiguity implies even more 
uncertainty and therefore provides latitude for construal. We hypothesize to find a stronger 
prediction error in ambiguous predictions. 
Furthermore, as the aggregated prediction of all participants reveals no information about the 
accuracy of the individual predictions we also want to go beyond the average analysis and 
also look at the individual predictions. We do not expect people to be able to abstract from 
their own preferences and we hypothesize to find egocentrically biased predictions, i.e. a false 
consensus effect in the prediction of others’ risky financial choices. We test whether the more 
risk seeking people tend to predict others to be more risk seeking as well and whether the 
more risk averse people predict others to be more risk averse. According to Gilovich we hy-
pothesize to find a stronger false consensus effect in the ambiguous situations that are not as 
clearly specified as the 50/50 lottery problems. 
 
 
2 Methodology 
 
We conducted a written questionnaire (Study 1) as well as a computer based questionnaire in 
our experimental lab. Participants in the written questionnaire were 84 students from the Uni-
versity of Mannheim attending the graduate course in banking. 23 female and 61 male stu-
dents, between 19 and 31 years old, answered the questions. In the questionnaire we use a 
within subject design. Participants first state their own certainty equivalents and afterwards 
predict the average choice of all participants. They were asked to consider hypothetical lottery 
questions. Lotteries were a fifty-fifty chance of winning 100 or 0 and a fifty-fifty chance of 
winning 200 or 50. The same outcomes were used for the ambiguity lotteries where subjects 
had no information about the probabilities except being between 0 and 100 %. 
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To display probabilities we used the classical illustration of an urn containing white and yel-
low balls. As an example Figure 1 shows the first question of the questionnaire (the whole 
questionnaire is displayed in Appendix A). The instructions read as follows: The following 
lottery either pays 100 € or 0 €. Imagine an urn containing 100 balls, 50 of them are yellow 
and 50 of them are white. One ball is drawn, if it is yellow the lottery pays 100 €, if it is white 
the lottery pays 0 €. All students answered the same questionnaire. First they were asked 
about their own certainty equivalent and subsequently for their prediction of the certainty 
equivalent of the average other participant. The second question shows the same lottery but 
with ambiguous probabilities. Again students should give their own certainty equivalent first 
and afterwards predict the average choice of the other participants. The instructions in this 
case are as follows: The following lottery either pays 100 € or 0 €. Imagine an urn containing 
100 balls. The balls are of yellow and white color, but the proportions are unknown. One ball 
is drawn, if it is yellow the lottery pays 100 €, if it is white the lottery pays 0 €. Students did 
the questionnaire in class during an exercise session. To motivate students to participate we 
randomly drew 5 questionnaires and paid 10 € to the prescriptive participant. Camerer and 
Hogarth (1999) show that incentives sometimes improve performance but often they do not. 
Moreover we know from our course evaluations that students enjoy participating in experi-
ments and questionnaires during the course. 
 
Figure 1: Extract from the written questionnaire, 50/50-lottery (100,0). 
The following lottery either pays 100 € or 0 €. Imagine an urn containing 100 balls, 50 of 
them are yellow and 50 of them are white. One ball is drawn, if it is yellow the lottery pays 
1000 €, if it is white the lottery pays 0 €. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state for which amount that you would receive for sure you would be indifferent 
between receiving the sure amount and playing the lottery                    ________  € 
 
What do you think, for which amount the participants in this questionnaire (thus students 
attending the exercise course in Banking) are on average indifferent between receiving the 
sure amount and playing the lottery?          ________  € 
white ball 
yellow ball 
100 € 
0 € 
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Participants in the lab were 199 graduate and undergraduate students from the University of 
Mannheim from various schools. 75 of them were female and 124 male, between 18 and 35 
years old. Participants were assigned randomly to two different groups to allow a between 
subject design. Thus we can control for ordering effects. One group (group self) states own 
certainty equivalents in the beginning whereas another group predicts the average choice of 
all participants (group other). In addition the group self afterwards was asked to predict oth-
ers’ preferences and the group other was asked to state own preferences but they did not know 
this in advance when answering the first questions. Lotteries in the lab were a fifty-fifty 
chance of winning 1000 or 0, a fifty-fifty chance of winning 200 or 0 and a fifty-fifty chance 
of winning 50 or 0. Again, the same outcomes were used for the ambiguous lotteries.3. Figure 
2 shows a screenshot of the first 50/50-lottery question in the group self. 
 
Figure 2: Screenshot from the computer based questionnaire, 
50/50-lottery (1000,0). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the treatment other in the lab, we also asked for an interval. Participants were asked to state 
a lower bound of the certainty equivalent that they think is not fallen short by more than 5 % 
and also an upper bound which is not exceeded by more than 5 % of the participants. Students 
received a flat payment of 5 Euros for their participation. We decided to have a flat payment 
                                                 
3 To conduct the computer based questionnaire we used the software z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade 
Economic Experiments). 
 
Question 1: 
The following lottery either pays 1000 € or 0 €. Imagine an urn containing 100 balls, 50 of 
them are yellow and 50 of them are white. One ball is drawn, if it is yellow the lottery pays 
1000 €, if it is white the lottery pays 0 € 
Please state for which amount that you would receive for sure you would be 
indifferent between receiving the sure amount and playing the lottery.
yellow ball
white ball 
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in order to have the same incentive structure in the treatments self and other. Moreover, as 
stated above we do not think that payment is crucial. 
 
 
3 Results and Discussion 
 
3.1 Analysis of average effects 
 
Descriptive statistics of the questionnaire results are shown in Table 1. People on average 
decide risk averse and they also show ambiguity aversion. Certainty equivalents are lower 
than expected values of the lotteries and the certainty equivalents belonging to the lotteries 
with unknown probabilities are still lower than those with fifty-fifty-probabilities (for an ex-
planation of ambiguity see Ellsberg, 1961). 
At first we want to test whether there is an effect on the average level. There is a clear stan-
dard for assessing the accuracy or inaccuracy of predictions: in case of an accurate prediction 
the mean predicted certainty equivalent would be equal to the mean stated own certainty 
equivalent. 
Our data from the studies follows somewhat skewed distributions. Therefore we will use non-
parametric tests of statistical significance. Looking at the questionnaire results in Table 1 
there is no overall prediction bias as in Hsee and Weber (1997) or in Faro and Rottenstreich 
(2006). Considering the mean (median) people do not seem to make a difference between 
stating own and evaluating others’ certainty equivalents. The Wilcoxon signed rank test 
shows that there are no significant differences between the certainty equivalents for the own 
person and the predicted ones for the other participants. On average people do not overesti-
mate the willingness of others to take risks or predict them to be closer to risk neutrality than 
they actually are. Our results may be compared with the third treatment in Hsee and Weber 
where participants were asked to predict preferences of the person sitting next to them in 
class. With this very concrete description of the other person the prediction bias disappeared. 
We conducted our questionnaire during an exercise class and asked the students for their own 
certainty equivalents and afterwards to predict the average choice of the participants. As the 
students were able to look around in the room at the other participants it is likely that we find 
the same concreteness effect as in Hsee and Weber. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (written questionnaire), 
The table shows descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, minimum 
value, maximum value) of the certainty equivalents. The upper part presents own pref-
erences, the middle part predictions of others’ preferences. The lower part compares 
own and predicted preferences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (computer based questionnaire), 
The table shows descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, minimum 
value, maximum value) of the certainty equivalents. The upper part presents own pref-
erences, the middle part predictions of others’ preferences. The lower part compares 
own and predicted preferences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
lottery (100,0) (200,50) (100,0) (200,50)
prob. 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
ce self self self self self
mean 44.46 110.19 34.33 90.46
median 50.00 113.50 30.00 90.00
sd 12.94 23.82 21.40 31.93
min 20.00 50.00 0.00 20.00
max 80.00 170.00 100.00 200.00
ce other other other other other
mean 42.55 106.82 35.12 90.06
median 45.00 106.00 30.00 90.00
sd 11.86 23.29 18.97 28.03
min 1.00 50.00 1.00 20.00
max 70.00 150.00 100.00 150.00
Wilcoxon not sig not sig not sig not sig
ce self > ce other 34 25 29 34
ce self < ce other 27 30 26 25
ce self = ce other 23 29 29 25
lottery (1000,0) (200,0) (50,0) (1000,0) (200,0) (50,0)
prob. 50/50 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/? ?/?
ce self self self self self self self
mean 440.33 93.37 25.99 362.48 81.61 23.00
median 500.00 100.00 25.00 350.00 80.00 24.00
sd 186.62 33.88 8.38 229.29 44.89 11.00
min 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 1.00 0.10
max 1000.00 200.00 50.00 1000.00 200.00 50.00
ce other other other other other other other
mean 424.34 93.13 24.89 390.35 81.44 22.34
median 500.00 100.00 25.00 400.00 80.00 20.00
sd 164.70 28.19 7.64 226.99 39.69 9.79
min 20.00 10.00 3.00 10.00 2.00 1.00
max 1000.00 150.00 50.00 1000.00 200.00 50.00
Wilcoxon not sig not sig p<0.01 not sig not sig not sig
ce self > ce other 66 64 75 69 75 77
ce self < ce other 62 62 41 79 77 60
ce self = ce other 71 73 83 51 47 62
 10
Table 2 shows similar results for the lottery questions in the lab. As we do not find strong 
ordering effects (see appendix B) we used all 199 observations regardless of whether they 
stated their own certainty equivalents first or whether they predicted those of others first. Only 
one out of six difference between self and others is significant. For the 50/50-lottery (50,0) the 
participants are more risk seeking for the own person than for others. This is in line with Faro 
and Rottenstreich (2006) who find that people are closer to risk neutrality when evaluating 
certainty equivalents of others compared to their own. The other five differences are like the 
questionnaire differences not significant. Hence we cannot find evidence for an effect on the 
aggregated level. Again this result is comparable to the third treatment of Hsee and Weber 
(1997). During the experiment students were sitting in the lab together with other participants. 
Up to 20 students did the experiment at the same time. So like in the questionnaire situation 
they were able to look around and thereby get a concrete view of the other participants. 
 
 
3.2 Individual level analysis 
 
So far we found that the average predicted certainty equivalent is not significantly different 
from the average own certainty equivalent. But does this necessarily mean that individual 
people are also able to make a good prediction? 
The financial analyst Paul Johnson (2004) found an interesting effect. From 1995 to 1999, he 
asked his students, studying at the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, to pre-
dict the winners in 12 Oscar categories. His results over the years have been pretty consistent, 
in all but one year, the consensus has never lost to an individual student. For instance, in 1997 
(a year in which 125 students voted) the average student was right on only 4.83 predictions, 
but the consensus got 11 out of 12 correct. So the consensus seems to be a better predictor 
than an individual prediction, as the prediction mistakes cancel each other out. 
In the following we go beyond the aggregated analysis and also look at individual predictions. 
We hypothesize to find a false consensus effect on the individual level. The more risk averse a 
person is herself the more risk averse she evaluates others and, vice versa, a more risk seeking 
person sees others also as more risk seeking. To gain first insights we split the data in two 
halves, the relatively more risk averse whose certainty equivalent is smaller than the median 
and the relatively more risk seeking people who have a certainty equivalent greater than the 
median. 
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Table 3: Splitting results, 
Mean and median certainty equivalents within different groups (Questionnaire), p-
values state the probability that the predictions of the two subgroups are the same. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Splitting results, 
Mean and median certainty equivalents within different groups (Lab), p-values state the 
probability that the predictions of the two subgroups are the same. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables 3 and 4 (Questionnaire and lab results) reveal first evidence for a false consensus ef-
fect. First, we perform a median split according to the stated own certainty equivalent.4 Thus 
we get one relatively risk averse subgroup (own certainty equivalent smaller than group me-
dian) and one relatively risk seeking subgroup (own certainty equivalent bigger than group 
median). Second we compare the predicted certainty equivalents for others given by the sub-
                                                 
4 In Tables 3 and 4 answers equal to the median drop out of the analysis. In some lotteries this is a considerable 
part, e.g. in the lab experiment when asked for the certainty equivalent for the 50/50-lottery (1000,0), 68 partici-
pants gave the median answer 500 €. Nevertheless, the results remain unchanged if the median observations are 
added to the relatively more risk averse or to the relatively more risk seeking subgroup (see appendix C). 
all subjects more risk averse subjects more risk seeking subjects
(ce self < median self) (ce self > median self)
lottery (100,0) self other self other obs self other obs p-value
50/50 mean 44.46 42.55 33.73 37.33 40 63.29 52.50 14 <0.01
median 50.00 45.00 35.00 40.00 60.00 50.00
?/? mean 34.33 35.12 13.46 21.75 28 52.97 48.17 36 <0.01
median 30.00 30.00 10.00 15.00 50.00 50.00
lottery (200,50)
50/50 mean 110.19 106.82 90.88 103.02 42 129.50 110.62 42 <0.06
median 113.50 106.00 100.00 100.00 125.00 120.00
?/? mean 90.46 90.06 64.35 70.43 40 119.58 111.06 36 <0.01
median 90.00 90.00 65.00 70.00 120.00 114.00
all subjects more risk averse subjects more risk seeking subjects
(ce self < median self) (ce self > median self)
lottery (1000,0) self other self other obs self other obs p-value
50/50 mean 440.33 424.34 292.74 375.87 91 674.65 454.43 40 <0.01
median 500.00 500.00 350.00 400.00 650.00 500.00
?/? mean 362.48 390.35 140.47 261.67 75 532.37 491.90 105 <0.01
median 350.00 400.00 150.00 200.00 500.00 500.00
lottery (200,0)
50/50 mean 93.37 93.13 64.77 77.54 81 134.11 109.02 45 <0.01
median 100.00 100.00 75.00 80.00 125.00 100.00
?/? mean 81.61 81.44 43.32 60.51 88 118.15 101.16 93 <0.01
median 80.00 80.00 50.00 50.00 100.00 100.00
lottery (50,0)
50/50 mean 25.99 24.89 21.21 20.54 58 34.10 28.87 69 <0.01
median 25.00 25.00 20.00 20.00 30.00 25.00
?/? mean 23.00 22.34 16.98 17.99 98 31.14 26.60 98 <0.01
median 24.00 20.00 15.00 20.00 27.00 25.00
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groups. P-values (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests)5 stated in the last column test the hypothesis that 
the predictions of the two subgroups are the same. For the 50/50 lottery (100,0) the relatively 
risk averse group states a mean certainty equivalent for others of 37.33 (median 40.00). In 
contrast the relatively risk seeking group states a mean certainty equivalent of 52.50 (median 
50.00). The difference is highly significant at the 1 percent level. This result is very robust, as 
we also find a significant difference in all of the other 9 lotteries. The relatively more risk 
averse people also give a more risk averse prediction compared to the risk seeking subgroup. 
 
Despite the significant differences in the predicted certainty equivalents between the sub-
groups the differences in the own certainty equivalents seem to be still higher. Hence, it seems 
to be the case that people adjust their own certainty equivalent when asked for a prediction of 
the average other. We compare the own certainty equivalents with the predicted certainty 
equivalents within the subgroups.6 For example, the relatively risk averse group in the ques-
tionnaire states a mean own certainty equivalent for the 50/50-lottery (100,0) of 33.73 (me-
dian 35.00) while the mean predicted certainty equivalent is 37.33 (median 40.00). The pre-
diction is significantly higher at the 5 percent level. In all but the ambiguous (200,50) lottery 
within the risk averse subgroup the prediction is significantly different (at least at the 5 per-
cent level) from the own certainty equivalent. The lab data confirms the questionnaire results. 
The difference between own and predicted certainty equivalent in the relatively risk seeking 
subgroup for the ambiguous (1000,0)-lottery is significant at the 5 percent level, all other dif-
ferences even at the 1 one percent level. So, indeed the more risk averse people estimate oth-
ers as less risk averse compared to themselves and the more risk seeking predict that others 
are less risk seeking and both groups are right with the direction of the adjustment. 
 
To test the strength of the adjustment, we performed another test and compare the predictions 
of the subgroups with the own certainty equivalent of the whole group.7 In all but the ambigu-
ous (200,50) lottery of the questionnaire the prediction is significantly different (at least at the 
5 percent level). The lab data shows a similar pattern. The prediction of the relatively more 
risk seeking subgroup for the 50/50-lottery (1000,0) is not significantly different from the 
own certainty equivalent of the whole group. All other predictions are significantly (at least at 
                                                 
5 We are not able to use the classical test of false consensus Ross, Greene and House (1977) define. This would 
be a test of the difference between the estimates of consensus for position A made by subjects who hold position 
A and the estimates of consensus for position A made by subjects who hold position B. As the certainty equiva-
lent is a continuous variable with a lot more than two possible parameter values we have to use other statistics in 
the following. 
6 P-Values (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) not reported in the table. 
7 P-Values (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) not reported in the table. 
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the 5 percent level) too low (risk averse subgroup) or too high (risk seeking subgroup). Thus 
although people adjust their own certainty equivalent in the right direction their adjustment is 
not strong enough. 
Figure 3 shows a plot of own and predicted certainty equivalents of the (100,0)-lottery with 
50/50-probabilities and with ambiguous probabilities (for other lotteries see appendix D). In 
addition to the data points a regression line is added to the Figure. A flat regression line would 
indicate no false consensus effect at all, i.e. the prediction would be independent from the size 
of the own certainty equivalent whereas a slope of 1 would indicate a “perfect” false consen-
sus effect, i.e. the prediction would be equal to the own certainty equivalent. Both regression 
lines in the figure  are not as steep as the 45 degree line, indicating that individuals adjust their 
own certainty equivalent in the right direction for the prediction of others. But still the rela-
tively more risk averse participants tend to predict others as too risk averse and the relatively 
more risk seeking vice versa (positive slope of the regression lines). For the 50/50-
probabilities the adjustment is stronger than for the ambiguous probabilities, the regression 
line is steeper in the latter case suggesting that the own preferences are even more crucial if 
uncertainty is higher. 
 
Figure 3: Plot of the (100,0)-lottery and regression lines for 50/50- and ?/?-probabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
self
 50/50 
 ?/? 
ot
he
r 
 14
In the following we analyze this effect in more detail. Table 5 shows Pearson correlation coef-
ficients. As expected all correlations are significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level.8 
This supports our hypothesis that a false consensus effect is present in financial decisions. The 
predictions of others’ preferences depend strongly on the own preferences. 
Furthermore it is noteworthy that correlations between own and predicted certainty equivalent 
are higher in the case of ambiguous lotteries. For example the correlation in the (100,0)-
lottery with 50/50-probabilities is 0.5447, with ambiguous probabilities the correlation in-
creases to 0.7667. The difference of the correlations with and without ambiguity is significant 
in all cases (questionnaire as well as lab), p-values are stated in the fourth column. So it seems 
to be the case that in situations with higher uncertainty (ambiguity) people rely more heavily 
on their own preference in order to predict certainty equivalents of other people.9 
 
Table 5: Correlation coefficients, 
p-values state the probability that correlations are the same. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Regression results (questionnaire): Regression of the predicted certainty 
equivalent on the own certainty equivalent and control variables. * indicates significance 
at the ten percent level,** indicates significance at the five percent level, *** indicates 
significance at the one percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
8 We used the stata module cortesti by H. M. Caci. The test is an approximation (to be used when both samples 
are larger than 10).  
9 Unreported Spearman rank correlation coefficients show similar results. 
Prob. Correlation p-value
Questionnaire
Lottery (100,0) 50/50 0.5447
?/? 0.7667 (p< 0.05)
Lottery (200,50) 50/50 0.2746
?/? 0.7266 (p< 0.01)
Lab
Lottery (1000,0) 50/50 0.3212
?/? 0.5733 (p< 0.01)
Lottery (200,0) 50/50 0.4996
?/? 0.7124 (p< 0.01)
Lottery (50,0) 50/50 0.6463
?/? 0.7522 (p< 0.10)
Prediction (100,0) Prediction (200,50)
50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/? 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -0.6233 -3.4770 -1.1746 -9.7995
(-0.25) (-1.14) (-0.21) (-2.09)**
Age 0.1022 0.5346 -0.7991 -.6655
(0.19) (0.81) (-0.66) (-0.65)
Own CE 0.4992 0.4966 0.6797 0.6651 0.2685 0.2708 0.6378 0.6380
(5.88)*** (5.72)*** (10.81)*** (10.40)*** (2.59)** (2.58)** (9.58)*** (9.71)***
Constant 20.3532 18.4492 11.7823 1.8821 77.2369 97.1545 32.3640 55.5530
(5.18)*** (1.34) (4.64)*** (0.12) (6.60)*** (3.09)*** (5.07)*** (2.24)**
N 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
Adjusted R-squared 0.2881 0.2711 0.5828 0.5814 0.0641 0.0469 0.5222 0.5401
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Table 7: Regression results (lab): Regression of the predicted on the own certainty 
equivalent and control variables. * indicates significance at the ten percent level,** indi-
cates significance at the five percent level, *** indicates significance at the one percent 
level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To control for other effects Tables 6 and 7 show regression results of the predicted on the own 
certainty equivalent and further variables. In the questionnaire (Table 6) we control for gender 
(dummy: 1= male, 0 = female) and age. The results show that predictions are not driven by 
age (however as we did the studies with student participants we have little variation in age in 
our dataset), gender is only significant in one regression. Thus the age of the person cannot 
explain how someone predicts others’ preferences. In the ambiguous (200,50)-lottery men 
predict a smaller certainty equivalent for the average other. This result does not contradict the 
frequent observation that women are in general more risk averse than men (see e.g. Dohmen 
et al. (2005)) because this is already included in the variable own certainty equivalent. It may 
be that men perceive others to be less risk seeking compared to themselves because they con-
sider risk seeking as an admirable characteristic and at the same time they think they are bet-
ter than others (risk-as-value hypothesis, see Hsee and Weber 1997). In all regressions the 
Prediction (1000,0) Prediction (200,0)
50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/? 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -23.6736 -8.4845 -4.6243 0.0563
(-0.97) (-0.29) (-1.20) (0.01)
Age 3.4995 2.4320 0.7963 2.4017
(0.61) (0.35) (0.87) (2.09)**
Semester -0.4594 -1.7782 -1.3589 -1.0644
(-0.09) (-0.28) (-1.62) (-1.02)
Knowledge 21.5843 21.1196 0.0604 6.1527
(0.85) (0.69) (0.02) (1.22)
Ordering -14.7702 -29.5712 -2.4219 -5.7441
(-1.10) (-1.82)* (-1.13) (-2.14)**
Own CE 0.2835 0.2971 0.5531 0.5664 0.3873 0.4069 0.5361 0.5592
(4.76)*** (4.89)*** (9.45)*** (9.53)*** (7.38)*** (7.67)*** (10.70)*** (11.12)***
Constant 299.53 156.17 189.88 115.78 56.9594 40.8753 37.6950 -19.8507
(10.52)*** (1.17) (7.57)*** (0.73) (10.93)*** (1.92)* (8.08)*** (-0.74)
N 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199
Adjusted R-squared 0.0986 0.0932 0.3086 0.3052 0.2126 0.2170 0.3643 0.3793
Prediction (50,0)
50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -0.6342 1.7237
(-0.61) (1.47)
Age 0.0307 0.4066
(0.13) (1.47)
Semester -0.1553 -0.4302
(-0.70) (-1.71)
Knowledge 0.2141 1.1281
(0.20) (0.93)
Ordering -0.0366 -0.3649
(-0.06) (-0.56)
Own CE 0.4611 0.4623 0.5647 0.5661
(8.23)*** (7.91)*** (11.52)*** (11.44)***
Constant 12.9057 11.9905 9.3514 3.3110
(8.43)*** (2.16)** (7.49)*** (0.52)
N 199 199 199 199
Adjusted R-squared 0.2519 0.2519 0.3994 0.4016
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own certainty equivalent is highly significant. In addition to this the regression coefficient and 
the R-squares are higher for ambiguous predictions. This supports our hypothesis that the pre-
diction depends on the own preference and that the influence of the own preference is espe-
cially strong for ambiguous situations. 
Participants in the lab (Table 7) were additionally asked to state their semester and subjective 
knowledge about financial markets. Moreover, we included a dummy considering ordering (0 
= group “self” at the beginning, 1 = group “other” at the beginning). Similar to the question-
naire predictions are not driven by gender. Age is only significant in the (200,0)-lottery with 
ambiguous probabilities. Financial knowledge (self assessment from 1 = very good to 6 = 
very bad) has no significant effect. Ordering is significant only in 2 cases in the sense that the 
predicted certainty equivalent is lower if participants first predicted the average certainty 
equivalent before they were asked for their own certainty equivalent. This result is mostly in 
line with results stated in appendix B showing that there is no overall ordering effect. Again, 
the own certainty equivalent is highly significant for all predictions and the coefficients are 
higher for lotteries with ambiguous probabilities. 
Our main results from the regressions can be summarized as follows: We document a highly 
significant effect of the own certainty equivalent on prediction of others. Moreover, this ef-
fects seems to be stronger for ambiguity. 
 
To include the effect of ambiguity in our regression analysis we use combined regressions 
with data from several lotteries (with and without ambiguity). To aggregate the data in one 
regression we cannot use the absolute values but need to normalize them. Predictions are 
normalized by the expected value of the lotteries, so the dependent variable is given by 
valueectedexp
valueectedexpequivalentyintcertapredicted − . Accordingly, the own certainty equivalent as 
an independent variable is given by 
valueectedexp
valueectedexpequivalentown −  .Thus instead of the ab-
solute certainty equivalents we use the relative deviations from the expected value. In addition 
to the expected values we did the same analysis using the mean stated certainty equivalents 
instead of the expected values. The results do not change (see Appendix F). 
 
In a first step the 50/50-lotteries and the ambiguous lotteries were aggregated in one regres-
sion, respectively. Results are stated in the left parts of Tables 8 (questionnaire) and 9 (lab). 
For demonstration Figure 4 shows a plot of the normalized data from the questionnaire (see 
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Appendix E for the same Figure with the lab data). In every regression (questionnaire and lab) 
the predicted certainty equivalent is highly significantly driven by the own certainty equiva-
lent. Moreover, the regression coefficient is higher for the ambiguous lotteries. 
Looking at the questionnaire results (Table 8, left part) gender yields a significant effect in the 
regression with the ambiguous lotteries in the sense that men predict the certainty equivalent 
of others to be smaller. Age has no explanatory power. Combining the lotteries from the lab 
we find the following significant effects in our control variables. For the 50/50-lotteries men’s 
predictions are lower, a higher semester also leads to a lower prediction. Higher financial 
knowledge causes a higher prediction and the predicted certainty equivalent is lower if par-
ticipants first gave a prediction before stating their own certainty equivalent. Age has no sig-
nificant influence. In the ambiguous case gender and financial knowledge do not have ex-
planatory power. Age and semester have a significant positive influence. The ordering effect 
is even stronger than in the 50/50 regression. However it is noteworthy that all independent 
significant variables expect for the own certainty equivalent show only very low regression 
coefficients. Thus a change in these variables does not have a strong effect on the predicted 
certainty equivalent. The adjusted R-squared is always higher in ambiguous situations, i.e. a 
greater part of the prediction can be explained by the explanatory variables, especially by the 
own certainty equivalent. The false consensus effect seems to be greater in situations with 
ambiguity. 
 
Figure 4: Plot of the combined lotteries (questionnaire) and regression lines for 50/50- 
and ?/?-probabilities. 
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Secondly we aggregate all observations in a single regression and add dummy variables indi-
cating whether ambiguity is involved or not. Results are stated in the right part of Tables 8 
and 9. 
 
Table 8: Regression results (questionnaire): 
Regression of the predicted certainty equivalent on the own certainty equivalent (nor-
malized by the expected value). Left side: Separate regressions for 2 lotteries with 50/50-
probabilities and 2 lotteries with ambiguous probabilities. Right side: Regressions with 
all 4 lotteries. 
* indicates significance at the ten percent level,** indicates significance at the five per-
cent level, *** indicates significance at the one percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Regression results (lab): 
Regression of the predicted certainty equivalent on the own certainty equivalent (nor-
malized by the expected value). Left side: Separate regressions for 3 lotteries with 50/50-
probabilities and 3 lotteries with ambiguous probabilities. Right side: Regressions with 
all 6 lotteries. 
* indicates significance at the ten percent level,** indicates significance at the five per-
cent level, *** indicates significance at the one percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted CE (Quest., each with 2 Lotteries) Predicted CE (Questionnaire, each with all 4 Lotteries)
50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -0.0166 -0.0742 -0.0139
(-0.50) (-2.09)** (-0.78)
Age -0.0022 0.0026 -0.0018
(-0.31) (0.34) (-0.46)
Dummy Ambiguity -0.0341 0.1335 0.1327
(-1.50) (7.08)*** (7.01)***
Own CE * Dummy Ambi 0.6608 0.8224 0.8209
(15.40)*** (17.83)*** (17.63)***
Own CE 0.4178 0.4160 0.6682 0.6582 0.6109 0.5948 0.2352 0.2057 0.2062
(6.41)*** (6.34)*** (14.90)*** (14.64)*** (17.23)*** (16.07)*** (6.451)*** (5.99)*** (6.00)***
Constant -0.0994 -0.0336 -0.0916 -0.1044 -0.0928 -0.0791 -0.0744 -0.1237 -0.0710
(-6.01)*** (-0.19) (-4.46)*** (-0.56) (-7.07)*** (-4.94)*** (-7.35)*** (-10.54)*** (-0.76)
N 168 168 168 168 336 336 336 336 336
Adjusted R-squared 0.1934 0.1855 0.5696 0.5757 0.4690 0.4710 0.6889 0.7289 0.7280
Predicted CE (Lab, each with 3 Lotteries) Predicted CE (Lab, each with all 6 Lotteries)
50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -0.0647 -0.0096 -0.0371
(-2.50)** (-0.31) (-1.85)*
Age 0.0073 0.0156 0.0114
(1.24) (2.21)** (2.48)**
Semester -0.0092 -0.0124 -0.0108
(-1.69)* (-1.93)* (-2.56)**
Knowledge -0.0182 -0.0122 -0.0152
(-1.65)* (-0.93) (-1.77)*
Ordering -0.0414 -0.0771 -0.0592
(-1.80)* (-2.81)*** (-3.31)***
Dummy Ambiguity -0.0314 -0.0153 -0.0148
(-1.73)* (-0.83) (-0.80)
Own CE * Dummy Ambi 0.1729 0.1640 0.1612
(3.96)*** (3.65)*** (3.59)***
Own CE 0.3881 0.3963 0.5521 0.5608 0.4961 0.4901 0.3854 0.3881 0.3960
(12.03)*** (12.26)*** (18.43)*** (18.64)*** (22.90)*** (22.35)*** (10.91)*** (10.94)*** (11.19)***
Constant -0.0559 -0.1819 -0.0712 -0.2930 -0.0660 -0.0510 -0.0631 -0.0559 -0.2293
(-4.84)*** (-1.46) (-4.86)*** (-1.97)** (-7.10)*** (-4.01)*** (-6.81)*** (-4.40)*** (2.35)**
N 597 597 597 597 1194 1194 1194 1194 1194
Adjusted R-squared 0.1942 0.2039 0.3623 0.3702 0.3049 0.3061 0.3133 0.3131 0.3219
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As the effects of own certainty equivalent and ambiguity do not need to be simply additive we 
also allow for interaction in our regression. The regression model (without control variables) 
is given by: 
Dummy*CE*CE*Dummy*CE S2S121O β+β+α+α=  or 
S2121O CE*)Dummy*(Dummy*CE β+β+α+α= , 
with:  CEO: CE other: Predicted certainty equivalent (normalized by the expected value), 
CES: CE self: Own certainty equivalent (normalized with by expected value), 
Dummy: 1 for ambiguous predictions, 0 otherwise. 
 
Not surprisingly in all regressions the own certainty equivalent is highly significant at the one 
percent level. Adding a simple dummy variable which is 1 for the ambiguous predictions and 
0 otherwise reveals no effect in the questionnaire data. The effect in the lab data is relatively 
weak (significant at the ten percent level). The interaction term is highly significant (on the 
one percent level) regardless of whether the simple dummy is included in the regression or 
not. The coefficient of the interaction term captures the difference in prediction power of the 
own certainty equivalent. This prediction power is significantly higher for ambiguous lotter-
ies. The coefficient for the dependant variable own certainty equivalent is now given by 
)*( 21 Dummyββ + , so in lotteries with fixed probabilities it is just 1β  but for ambiguous lot-
teries the coefficient is 21 ββ + . Thus the predicted certainty equivalent is higher the higher 
the own certainty equivalent is and with ambiguity this relationship is even stronger. 
The constant term in the regression is given by Dummy*21 αα + , it is simply 1α  for the 
50/50-probabilities and 21 αα +  for the ambiguous cases. 2α  is significant for the question-
naire date (compare columns 9 and 10, Table 8), the constant term is higher with ambiguity. 
For the lab data 2α  is not significant (compare columns 9 and 10, Table 9). 
 
The previous analysis very clearly shows that the false consensus effect is present also in fi-
nancial decisions. Even if the group seems to be able to give a good prediction the predictions 
of a single individual is egocentrically biased. Indeed we found that people are partly aware 
that they are more or less risk seeking than the average individual and adjust their own cer-
tainty equivalent in the right direction, so the prediction is not equal to the own certainty 
equivalent. But the own preference is not adjusted highly enough. In addition, we found that 
the bias is higher in situations with higher uncertainty. Having to give a prediction in the case 
of an ambiguous lottery people’s egocentric bias is stronger. 
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4 Interval analysis 
 
In this subsection we report the results from the interval predictions. In the lab experiment 
participants were asked to state a lower bound that they think is not fallen short by more than 
5 % of the participants and also an upper bound which is not exceeded by more than 5 %. We 
are interested if people are aware of the of variety of others’ preferences. Are they able to 
imagine that others might have absolutely different preferences compared to their own. It may 
be that they are wrong in predicting the average but aware of the range of preferences. In con-
trast to this it may also be the case that they are right in predicting the average but fail to 
imagine individual differences. Figure 5 shows a histogram of stated certainty equivalents for 
the 50/50-lottery (1000,0). The vertical lines include the 90 percent interval, 50 is the true 
lower bound and 750 the true upper bound. 
 
Figure 5: Histogram of stated certainty equivalents for the 50/50-lottery (1000,0), 
The vertical lines indicate the 90 percent interval (50-750). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the predicted intervals by the participants. The average predicted lower bound 
for the 50/50-lottery (1000,0) is 239.75 (median 200), only 29 of 199 predicted the bound to 
be equal or below 50. The average predicted upper bound is 646.11 (median 600). In this case 
74 participants stated an upper bound equal to or above 750. Only 11 subjects were able to 
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state a lower bound low enough and at the same time an upper bound high enough, i.e. to give 
an interval that contains the true 90 percent interval. 
The intervals are ordered by the size of the own certainty equivalents (x-axis from low to 
high). 
 
Figure 6: Predicted 90 percent intervals for the 50/50-lottery (1000,0), 
The intervals are ordered by the size of the own certainty equivalents (x-axis from low to 
high). The true 90 percent interval (50-750) is indicated by horizontal lines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: True and predicted lower and upper bounds, 
the true bounds are given in column 2, column 3 states the mean and median predic-
tions. Column 4 gives the number of correct predictions (lower bound correct, i.e. low 
enough, upper bound correct, i.e. high enough, both bounds correct) 
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n=199 Mean predicted
low up low up interval (%) low up both
Lottery (1000,0)
50/50 50 750 239.75  /  200 646.11  /  600 80.90 29 74 11
?/? 50 800 203.87  /  150 632.95  /  600 60.80 54 64 12
Lottery (200,0)
50/50 25 150 53.37  /  50 137.28  /  140 81.91 49 93 21
?/? 10 188 44.55  /  40 131.68  /  125 76.38 39 28 9
Lottery (50,0)
50/50 10 40 14.84  /  15 35.31  /  35 89.45 88 80 35
?/? 5 50 12.37  /  10 35.47  /  35 77.89 64 27 7
Mean / median prediction Prediction right?90 % interval
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Appendix G shows histograms of the other 5 lotteries. Table 9 summarizes the results for all 
six lotteries. Column 2 shows the true 90 percent interval, column 3 the predicted lower and 
upper bounds. Column 4 displays the proportion of certainty equivalents which would be in-
cluded between the mean lower and the mean upper bound. As an example take the 50/50-
lottery (1000,0): the true 90 percent interval is 50 to 750. But the mean predicted interval 
239.75 to 646.11 contains only 80.90 percent of the certainty equivalents of all participants. 
Column 5 shows the number of subjects who were able to give both: a lower bound low 
enough and an upper bound high enough. For the 50/50-lottery (1000,0) 29 participants gave 
a lower bound low enough, 74 gave an upper bound high enough and only 11 of them gave 
both at the same time. The true 90 percent intervals are larger for the ambiguous lotteries, for 
the (1000,0)-lottery only the upper bound is higher, for the other two lotteries the upper 
bounds are higher and simultaneously the lower bounds are lower for the ambiguous lottery. 
This is in line with the descriptive statistics (Table 2) as the standard deviation is higher for 
stated own certainty equivalents as well as for predicted certainty equivalents in case of ambi-
guity. 
The results obviously show that the vast majority is not able to predict the variation in others’ 
certainty equivalents correctly. Others are predicted to be too consistent in their decisions, the 
90 percent intervals are too tight. The effect is stronger for ambiguous predictions. The pre-
dicted intervals contain about 80 to 90 percent of the certainty equivalents for the 50/50-
lotteries, but only about 60 to 80 percent for the ambiguous lotteries.  
Table 10 states regression results. It is similar to Table 7, but this time the dependent variables 
are predicted lower and upper bounds instead of predicted average certainty equivalents. 
Again, the own certainty equivalent is a highly significant explanatory variable. The higher 
the own certainty equivalent the higher the predicted lower bound and the same with the up-
per bound. Again the effect seems to be greater in situations with ambiguity as the regression 
coefficient of the own certainty equivalent as well as the adjusted R-squared are higher in 
ambiguous situations. Even though we find a positive regression coefficient of the own cer-
tainty equivalent for the lower and for the upper predicted bound it is noteworthy that we can-
not find a correlation between total size of the interval and size of the own certainty equiva-
lent. 
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Table 10: Regression results (lab): regression of the predicted lower and upper bounds 
on the own certainty equivalent and control variables. * indicates significance at the ten 
percent level,** indicates significance at the five percent level, *** indicates significance 
at the one percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lower bound (1000,0) Upper bound (1000,0)
50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/? 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -33.8767 -35.1811 -105.7721 -19.2885
(-1.37) (-1.29) (-2.92)*** (-0.55)
Age -0.2500 7.9861 16.9950 -5.0586
(-0.04) (1.28) (2.05)** (-0.63)
Semester -1.2204 -6.5716 -8.4151 5.3848
(-0.23) (-1.15) (-1.10) (0.74)
Knowledge -22.3995 -9.1407 -9.9690 5.3234
(-2.12)** (-0.78) (-0.65) (0.36)
Ordering -7.3730 -26.5674 -73.1291 -78.2999
(-0.33) (-1.09) (-2.26)** (-2.52)**
Own CE 0.1173 0.1208 0.3708 0.3838 0.2717 0.3184 0.4466 0.4642
(2.00)** (2.03)** (7.07)*** (7.20)*** (3.08)*** (3.65)*** (6.62)*** (6.84)***
Constant 188.1038 291.2794 69.4733 -18.0166 526.4613 292.4890 471.0715 587.2674
(6.71)*** (2.50)** (3.09)*** (-0.14) (12.49)*** (1.72)* (16.29)*** (3.62)***
N 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199
Adjusted R-squared 0.0150 0.0165 0.1982 0.1945 0.0412 0.0958 0.1778 0.1912
Lower bound (200,0) Upper bound (200,0)
50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/? 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -13.5292 -2.4383 -9.5377 -3.4628
(-2.91)*** (-0.49) (-1.64) (-0.57)
Age -0.5167 1.6518 1.5745 1.4060
(0.49) (1.45) (1.18) (1.00)
Semester -0.8017 -1.0655 -1.4270 0.1204
(-0.82) (-1.03) (-1.17) (0.09)
Knowledge -4.8133 0.9612 1.1515 0.9565
(-2.43)** (0.46) (0.46) (0.37)
Ordering 2.5484 0.4594 -10.6736 -16.5047
(0.62) (0.10) (-2.07)** (-3.04)***
Own CE 0.2971 0.3166 0.3882 0.4007 0.3860 0.4162 0.4195 0.4433
(4.83)*** (5.14)*** (8.03)*** (8.11)*** (5.05)*** (5.42)*** (6.86)*** (7.27)***
Constant 25.6296 38.0452 12.8701 -21.8121 101.2382 78.9073 97.4495 69.4424
(4.20)*** (1.72)* (2.86)*** (-0.92) (13.34)*** (2.86)*** (17.12)*** (2.38)**
N 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199
Adjusted R-squared 0.1014 0.1301 0.2465 0.2344 0.1101 0.1314 0.1887 0.2193
Lower bound (50,0) Upper bound (50,0)
50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/? 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -0.9379 1.2455 -2.6568 2.2452
(-0.69) (0.94) (-2.04)** (1.59)
Age -0.2460 0.2828 0.1225 0.1078
(-0.79) (0.93) (0.41) (0.33)
Semester 0.0597 -0.2474 -0.1120 -0.0215
(0.21) (-0.89) (-0.41) (-0.07)
Knowledge 0.0105 0.5872 0.5148 1.0223
(0.02) (1.04) (0.93) (1.69)*
Ordering 2.9916 1.9034 -0.6318 -1.0801
(2.44)** (1.62) (-0.54) (-0.86)
Own CE 0.2862 0.3150 0.4150 0.4224 0.4265 0.4041 0.4341 0.4436
(3.97)*** (4.29)*** (7.79)*** (7.87)*** (6.18)*** (5.76)*** (7.64)*** (7.73)***
Constant 7.4004 11.0535 2.8227 -5.9198 24.2234 23.1387 25.4898 19.0449
(3.76)*** (1.72)* (2.08)** (-0.95) (12.86)*** (3.77)*** (17.60)*** (2.85)***
N 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199
Adjusted R-squared 0.0693 0.0815 0.2316 0.2352 0.1581 0.1719 0.2246 0.2250
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To test whether the influence of ambiguity is significant for predicting the interval we use 
combined regressions again with data from all six lotteries. The regression models (equivalent 
to Table 9) are given by: 
S2121O CE*)Dummy*(Dummy*LB ββαα +++=  (left part of Table 11) and 
S2121O CE*)Dummy*(Dummy*UB ββαα +++=  (right part of Table11), 
with:  LBO: LB other: Predicted lower bound of others’ certainty equivalents (normalized by 
the expected value), 
UBO: UB other: Predicted upper bound of others’ certainty equivalents (normalized by the 
expected value), 
Dummy: 1 for ambiguous predictions, 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 11: Regression results (lab): regression with all 6 lotteries of the predicted lower 
(left side) and upper bounds (right side) on the own certainty equivalent and control 
variables. * indicates significance at the ten percent level,** indicates significance at the 
five percent level, *** indicates significance at the one percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As expected the influence of the own certainty equivalent is highly significant for the pre-
dicted lower as well as for the predicted upper bound. Adding a simple dummy variable 
which is 1 for ambiguous predictions and 0 otherwise yields a significant effect only for the 
predicted lower bound. The model with interaction term shows that the influence of the own 
certainty equivalent is higher for the ambiguous lottery, i.e. 2β  is significant. The effect is 
robust to the inclusion of control variables. Of the control variables only gender yields a sig-
nificant effect in the sense that men predict the lower bound to be smaller. For the upper 
bound a simple ambiguity dummy and an interaction term have no significant explanatory 
Predicted lower bound (all 6 Lotteries) Predicted upper bound (all 6 Lotteries)
Gender -0.0487 -0.0663
(-2.32)** (-2.62)***
Age 0.0065 0.0106
(1.36) (1.83)*
Semester -0.0071 -0.0040
(-1.61) (-0.76)
Knowledge -0.0127 0.0125
(-1.42) (1.16)
Ordering 0.0237 -0.1081
(1.27) (-4.80)***
Dummy Ambiguity -0.0423 -0.0275 -0.0280 0.0291 0.0368 0.0389
(-2.25)** (-1.43) (-1.45) (1.27) (1.56) (1.67)*
Own CE * Dummy Ambi 0.1666 0.1507 0.1439 0.0563 0.0775 0.0877
(3.66)*** (3.22)*** (3.07)*** (1.01) (1.36) (1.55)
Own CE 0.3436 0.3355 0.2368 0.2417 0.2478 0.4096 0.4152 0.3735 0.3670 0.3694
(15.24)*** (14.72)*** (6.44)*** (6.55)*** (6.70)*** (14.96)*** (14.97)*** (8.32)*** (8.14)*** (8.28)***
Constant -0.4683 -0.4481 -0.4655 -0.4526 -0.6027 0.3933 0.3793 0.3942 0.3770 0.0829
(-48.45)*** (-33.95)*** (-48.27)*** (-34.23)*** (-5.92)*** (33.50)*** (23.63)*** (33.47)*** (23.35)*** (0.67)
N 1194 1194 1194 1194 1194 1194 1194 1194 1194 1194
Adjusted R-squared 0.1624 0.1652 0.1710 0.1717 0.1749 0.1573 0.1578 0.1573 0.1584 0.1821
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power. Adding control variables leads to a significant effect (ten percent level) of the simple 
dummy, i.e. 2α  is significant. The t-statistic for the interaction term is 1.55, this corresponds 
to a significance level of 13 percent thus the tendency is in line with the effect for the lower 
bound. Again men predict the upper bound to be smaller than women. The older a person the 
higher the upper bound and the predicted upper bound is lower if participants first gave a pre-
diction of other certainty equivalent as well as an interval prediction before stating their own 
certainty equivalent. 
The results from the interval analysis can be summarized as follows. People are not able to 
estimate the variance of other peoples’ risk preferences correctly. The predicted 90 percent 
intervals are much too tight (Table 9). The relatively more risk averse people give smaller 
lower as well as smaller upper bounds and the relatively more risk seeking people give higher 
lower and upper bounds. There is at least the tendency that the influence of the own certainty 
equivalent is even stronger in ambiguous situations. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
In two studies we found strong evidence for a false consensus effect in financial lottery ques-
tions. In contrast to Hsee and Weber (1997) in their first two treatments or Faro and Rotten-
streich (2006) we do not find an effect on the aggregated level. The average predictions of 
others certainty equivalents in our studies are in general not significantly different from the 
average certainty equivalent. Our results are in line with the third treatment of Hsee and We-
ber as they do not find an average effect when the other person is specified as the person sit-
ting next to them. 
However, we find effects on the individual level that have not been analyzed by other studies 
in the financial context. Our results show that relatively more risk averse people adjust their 
prediction in the right direction. They predict the average certainty equivalent to be higher 
than their own certainty equivalent, but this prediction is still too risk averse, i.e. the predicted 
certainty equivalent is too low. The same results are found for the relatively more risk seeking 
subjects. They predict that others are relatively more risk averse compared to themselves and 
they are right. But again, their adjustment is not strong enough, the prediction is still too risk 
seeking. 
Moreover, we extend the scope of Gilovich (1990) to financial decisions, i.e. we do not only 
analyze 50/50-lotteries but also lotteries with ambiguous probabilities. As expected, we find 
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the false consensus effect to be even stronger for these ambiguous lotteries. The explanatory 
power of the own preference is higher for lotteries with ambiguous probabilities. 
In the lab experiment we also asked participants to state a 90 percent interval. Only very few 
students were able to state a correct interval (Table 7). The spread in other people’s prefer-
ences is highly underestimated. Again we find a significant influence of the own preference. 
The higher the own certainty equivalent the higher the predicted lower and upper bounds. For 
ambiguous lotteries the influence of the own certainty equivalent tends to be stronger. 
In practice assessing the real preferences of people whom one does not know or assessing the 
average individual is quite a common task. Think of a fund manager investing money for a 
group of investors or of a medical firm that develops a new medicine and has to decide on the 
trade off between efficiency and adverse effects. If individuals have difficulties to abstract 
from their own risk preference this leads to a biased prediction of others’ preferences and 
choices on behalf of others may be sub optimal. Moreover, an individual is not able to access 
the spread in others’ preferences correctly. For a financial advisor, for example, this underes-
timation of variety of opinions could lead to a too standardized advice concept. 
The more uncertainty is involved in a situation the stronger the bias is. As most financial deci-
sions in the real world imply a high degree of uncertainty (risky outcomes, risky probabilities, 
risky environment, e.g. legal regulation etc.) it is especially important to have detailed infor-
mation about potential clients’ risk preferences. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Liebe Studierende, 
 
bitte lesen Sie diese kurze Anleitung sorgfältig durch, bevor Sie mit der Beantwortung der 
Fragen beginnen. 
 
Im Folgenden sind verschiedene Lotterien dargestellt, zu denen wir Sie jeweils um eine Indifferenz-
aussage bitten werden. 
Indifferenz zwischen zwei Alternativen bedeutet, dass es Ihnen egal ist, welche der zwei Alternativen 
Sie bekommen. Wenn Sie also beispielsweise vor zwei Eisbechern sitzen, einer mit Erdbeereis, der 
andere mit Vanilleeis, und es Ihnen egal ist, welchen der beiden Sie bekommen, dann sind Sie indiffe-
rent zwischen den Alternativen Erdbeerbecher und Vanillebecher. 
Indifferenz zwischen einer Lotterie und einer sicheren Zahlung bedeutet somit, dass es Ihnen egal ist, 
ob Sie an der Lotterie teilnehmen oder die sichere Zahlung erhalten. 
 
 
Als kleines Dankeschön werden aus den beantworteten Fragebögen 5 Teilnehmer ausgelost, die je-
weils 10 € erhalten. 
 
Wenn Sie an der Verlosung teilnehmen möchten, tragen Sie bitte noch hier Ihre Matrikel-Nummer ein. 
Matrikel-Nummer: _______________ 
Dieses Deckblatt wird vor der Auswertung abgetrennt, Ihre Daten werden selbstverständlich anonym 
ausgewertet. 
 
 
Und los geht’s... 
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1. Die folgende Lotterie zahlt entweder 100 € oder 0 € aus. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass in einer Urne 
genau 100 Kugeln sind, davon sind 50 Kugeln gelb und 50 Kugeln weiß. Wird eine gelbe Kugel 
gezogen, so gewinnen Sie 100 €, wird eine weiße Kugel gezogen, so gewinnen Sie nichts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bitte geben Sie an, bei welcher Zahlung, die Sie sicher erhalten würden, Sie indifferent wären 
zwischen dieser sicheren Zahlung und der obigen Lotterie?                    ________  € 
 
Was glauben Sie, für welche Zahlung die Teilnehmer dieser Studie (also Studenten, die die 
Übung Bankbetriebslehre besuchen) im Durchschnitt indifferent wären zwischen dieser siche-
ren Zahlung und der obigen Lotterie?         ________  € 
 
 
 
2. Die folgende Lotterie zahlt entweder 100 € oder 0 € aus. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass in einer Urne 
genau 100 Kugeln, gelbe und weiße, sind. Der jeweilige Anteil ist dabei allerdings unbekannt. 
Wird eine gelbe Kugel gezogen, so gewinnen Sie 100 €, wird eine weiße Kugel gezogen, so ge-
winnen Sie nichts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bitte geben Sie an, bei welcher Zahlung, die Sie sicher erhalten würden, Sie indifferent wären 
zwischen dieser sicheren Zahlung und der obigen Lotterie?                    ________  € 
 
Was glauben Sie, für welche Zahlung die Teilnehmer dieser Studie im Durchschnitt indifferent 
wären zwischen dieser sicheren Zahlung und der obigen Lotterie?      ________  € 
weiße Kugel 
gelbe Kugel 
100 € 
0 € 
weiße Kugel 
gelbe Kugel 
100 € 
0 € 
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3. Die folgende Lotterie zahlt entweder 200 € oder 50 € aus. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass in einer Urne 
genau 100 Kugeln sind, davon sind 50 Kugeln gelb und 50 Kugeln weiß. Wird eine gelbe Kugel 
gezogen, so gewinnen Sie 200 €, wird eine weiße Kugel gezogen, so gewinnen Sie 50 €. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bitte geben Sie an, bei welcher Zahlung, die Sie sicher erhalten würden, Sie indifferent wären 
zwischen dieser sicheren Zahlung und der obigen Lotterie?                    ________  € 
 
Was glauben Sie, für welche Zahlung die Teilnehmer dieser Studie im Durchschnitt indifferent 
wären zwischen dieser sicheren Zahlung und der obigen Lotterie?      ________  € 
 
 
 
4. Die folgende Lotterie zahlt entweder 200 € oder 50 € aus. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass in einer Urne 
genau 100 Kugeln, gelbe und weiße, sind. Der jeweilige Anteil ist dabei allerdings unbekannt. 
Wird eine gelbe Kugel gezogen, so gewinnen Sie 200 €, wird eine weiße Kugel gezogen, so ge-
winnen Sie 50 €. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bitte geben Sie an, bei welcher Zahlung, die Sie sicher erhalten würden, Sie indifferent wären 
zwischen dieser sicheren Zahlung und der obigen Lotterie?                    ________  € 
 
Was glauben Sie, für welche Zahlung die Teilnehmer dieser Studie im Durchschnitt indifferent 
wären zwischen dieser sicheren Zahlung und der obigen Lotterie?      ________  € 
weiße Kugel 
gelbe Kugel 
200 € 
50 € 
weiße Kugel 
gelbe Kugel 
200 € 
50 € 
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Zum Schluss benötigen wir noch einige Angaben zu Ihrer Person: 
 
Ihr Geschlecht: 
weiblich O 
männlich O 
 
Ihr Alter in Jahren:  _____ Jahre 
 
Ihr Studiengang:  _________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme! 
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Appendix B: Ordering effects 
 
 
Table B.1: Differences in own certainty equivalents subject to the ordering of questions 
(self before other: predictions follow statements of own certainty equivalents, 
other before self: statements of own certainty equivalents follow predictions). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.2: Differences in predicted certainty equivalents subject to the ordering of ques-
tions (self before other: predictions follow statements of own certainty equivalents, 
other before self: statements of own certainty equivalents follow predictions). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
self before other:
lottery (1000,0) (200,0) (50,0) (1000,0) (200,0) (50,0)
prob. 50/50 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/? ?/?
ce self    s1a s1b s1c s2a s2b s2c
mean   419,83 91,38 27,52 336,17 79,77 23,17
median 500,00 100,00 25,00 300,00 75,00 22,50
sd   184,50 30,50 9,23 250,69 48,61 12,19
min          0,00 0,00 5,00 0,00 2,00 0,50
max       1000,00 200,00 50,00 1000,00 200,00 50,00
other before self:
ce self       s1a s1b s1c s2a s2b s2c
mean   457,95 95,08 24,67 385,10 83,19 22,85
median 500,00 100,00 25,00 400,00 85,00 25,00
sd   187,48 36,59 7,35 207,69 41,59 9,92
min          0,00 5,00 5,00 3,00 1,00 0,10
max       1000,00 200,00 50,00 1000,00 200,00 50,00
Wilcoxon not sig not sig p< 0,10 p<0,05 not sig not sig
self before other:
lottery (1000,0) (200,0) (50,0) (1000,0) (200,0) (50,0)
prob. 50/50 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/? ?/?
ce other    a11a1    a11b1    a11c1    a12a1   a12b1   a12c1
mean  442,42 94,39 25,28 405,67 85,79 22,49
median 500,00 100,00 25,00 400,00 80,00 20,00
sd 161,13 31,67 8,15 241,17 43,85 10,21
min    50,00 20,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 5,00
max   1000,00 200,00 50,00 1000,00 200,00 50,00
other before self:
ce other      a11a1     a11b1  a11c1   a12a1   a12b1   a12c1
mean   408,79 92,04 24,56 377,18 77,71 22,21
median 500,00 100,00 25,00 400,00 75,00 20,00
sd  166,90 24,92 7,19 214,32 35,52 9,46
min   20,00 10,00 3,00 10,00 2,00 1,00
max    750,00 150,00 50,00 1000,00 200,00 50,00
Wilcoxon not sig not sig not sig not sig not sig not sig
 34
Appendix C: Median splits 
 
 
Table C.1: Splitting results, 
mean and median certainty equivalents within different groups (Questionnaire). In the 
first Table median observations are added to the relatively more risk averse subgroup, 
in the second Table median observations are added to the relatively more risk seeking 
subgroup. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
all subjects more risk averse subjects more risk seeking subjects
(ce self <= median self) (ce self > median self)
lottery (100,0) self other self other obs self other obs p-value
50/50 mean 44.46 42.55 40.70 40.56 70 63.29 52.50 14 <0.01
median 50.00 45.00 40.00 40.00 60.00 50.00
?/? mean 34.33 35.12 20.35 25.33 48 52.97 48.17 36 <0.01
median 30.00 30.00 25.00 21.00 50.00 50.00
lottery (200,50)
50/50 mean 110.19 106.82 90.88 103.02 42 129.50 110.62 42 <0.06
median 113.50 106.00 100.00 100.00 125.00 120.00
?/? mean 90.46 90.06 68.63 74.31 48 119.58 111.06 36 <0.01
median 90.00 90.00 70.00 70.50 120.00 114.00
all subjects more risk averse subjects more risk seeking subjects
(ce self < median self) (ce self >= median self)
lottery (100,0) self other self other obs self other obs p-value
50/50 mean 44.46 42.55 33.73 37.33 40 54.23 47.30 44 <0.01
median 50.00 45.00 35.00 40.00 50.00 50.00
?/? mean 34.33 35.12 13.46 21.75 28 44.77 41.80 56 <0.01
median 30.00 30.00 10.00 15.00 40.00 40.00
lottery (200,50)
50/50 mean 110.19 106.82 90.88 103.02 42 129.50 110.62 42 <0.06
median 113.50 106.00 100.00 100.00 125.00 120.00
?/? mean 90.46 90.06 64.35 70.43 40 114.20 107.91 44 <0.01
median 90.00 90.00 65.00 70.00 100.00 105.00
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Table C.2: Splitting results, 
mean and median certainty equivalents within different groups (lab). In the first Table 
median observations are added to the relatively more risk averse subgroup, in the sec-
ond Table median observations are added to the relatively more risk seeking subgroup. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
all subjects more risk averse subjects more risk seeking subjects
(ce self < median self) (ce self > median self)
lottery (1000,0) self other self other obs self other obs p-value
50/50 mean 440.33 424.34 381.38 416.77 159 674.65 454.43 40 <0.08
median 500.00 500.00 444.00 500.00 650.00 500.00
?/? mean 362.48 390.35 172.71 276.91 94 532.37 491.90 105 <0.01
median 350.00 400.00 200.00 250.00 500.00 500.00
lottery (200,0)
50/50 mean 93.37 93.13 81.47 88.48 154 134.11 109.02 45 <0.01
median 100.00 100.00 90.00 100.00 125.00 100.00
?/? mean 81.61 81.44 49.55 64.15 106 118.15 101.16 93 <0.01
median 80.00 80.00 50.00 60.00 100.00 100.00
lottery (50,0)
50/50 mean 25.99 24.89 23.31 23.99 130 34.10 28.87 69 <0.01
median 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 30.00 25.00
?/? mean 23.00 22.34 17.18 18.20 101 31.14 26.60 98 <0.01
median 24.00 20.00 15.00 20.00 27.00 25.00
all subjects more risk averse subjects more risk seeking subjects
(ce self < median self) (ce self > median self)
lottery (1000,0) self other self other obs self other obs p-value
50/50 mean 440.33 424.34 292.74 375.87 91 564.69 465.19 108 <0.01
median 500.00 500.00 350.00 400.00 500.00 500.00
?/? mean 362.48 390.35 140.47 261.67 75 496.77 468.19 124 <0.01
median 350.00 400.00 150.00 200.00 500.00 450.00
lottery (200,0)
50/50 mean 93.37 93.13 64.77 77.54 81 113.01 103.82 118 <0.01
median 100.00 100.00 75.00 80.00 100.00 100.00
?/? mean 81.61 81.44 43.32 60.51 88 111.96 98.04 111 <0.01
median 80.00 80.00 50.00 50.00 100.00 100.00
lottery (50,0)
50/50 mean 25.99 24.89 21.21 20.54 58 29.45 27.79 141 <0.01
median 25.00 25.00 20.00 20.00 25.00 25.00
?/? mean 23.00 22.34 16.98 17.99 98 30.93 26.55 101 <0.01
median 24.00 20.00 15.00 20.00 26.00 25.00
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Appendix D: Lottery plots 
 
Figure D.1: Plot of the (200,50)-lottery and regression lines for 50/50- and ?/?-
probabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.2: Plot of the (1000,0)-lottery and regression lines for 50/50- and ?/?-
probabilities. 
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Figure D.3: Plot of the (200,0)-lottery and regression lines for 50/50- and ?/?-
probabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.4: Plot of the (50,0)-lottery and regression lines for 50/50- and ?/?-
probabilities. 
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Appendix E: Lotteries plot 
 
 
Figure E.1: Plot of the combined lotteries (questionnaire) and regression lines for 50/50- 
and ?/?-probabilities. 
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Appendix F: Regression Results 
 
 
Table F.1: Regression Results Questionnaire: Regression of the predicted certainty 
equivalent on the own certainty equivalent (normalized by the mean certainty equiva-
lent). Left side: Separate regressions for 2 Lotteries with 50/50-probabilities and 2 lotter-
ies with ambiguous probabilities. Right side: Regressions with all 4 lotteries. 
* indicates significance at the ten percent level,** indicates significance at the five per-
cent level, *** indicates significance at the one percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.2: Regression Results Lab: Regression of the predicted certainty equivalent on 
the own certainty equivalent (normalized by the mean certainty equivalent). Left side: 
Separate regressions for 3 Lotteries with 50/50-probabilities and 3 lotteries with am-
biguous probabilities. Right side: Regressions with all 6 lotteries. 
* indicates significance at the ten percent level,** indicates significance at the five per-
cent level, *** indicates significance at the one percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted CE (Quest., each with 2 Lotteries) Predicted CE (Questionnaire, each with all 4 Lotteries)
50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -0.0188 -0.1050 -0.0160
(-0.50) (-2.06)** (-0.79)
Age -0.0025 0.0040 -0.0020
(-0.31) (0.36) (-0.45)
Dummy Ambiguity 0.0461 0.0380 0.0381
(1.62) (2.13)** (2.13)**
Own CE * Dummy Ambi 0.8680 0.8663 0.8637
(22.45)*** (22.53)*** (22.31)***
Own CE 0.4172 0.4153 0.6695 0.6595 0.6181 0.6181 0.1554 0.1563 0.1570
(6.39)*** (6.32)*** (14.91)*** (14.64)*** (17.34)*** (17.38)*** (5.09)*** (5.15)*** (5.16)***
Constant -0.0368 0.0382 0.0092 -0.0116 -0.0138 -0.0368 -0.0178 -0.0368 0.0227
(-2.21)** (0.19) (0.41) (-0.04) (-0.97) (-1.83)* (-1.98)** (-2.91)*** (0.21)
N 168 168 168 168 336 336 336 336 336
Adjusted R-squared 0.1925 0.1846 0.5700 0.5757 0.4721 0.4747 0.7895 0.7917 0.7910
Predicted CE (Lab, each with 3 Lotteries) Predicted CE (Lab, each with all 6 Lotteries)
50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -0.0698 -0.0171 -0.0434
(-2.55)** (-0.44) (-1.83)*
Age 0.0077 0.0187 0.0131
(1.23) (2.09)** (2.41)**
Semester -0.0092 -0.0147 -0.0120
(-1.60) (-1.81)* (-2.40)**
Knowledge -0.0203 -0.0161 -0.0182
(-1.74)* (-0.97) (-1.80)*
Ordering -0.0466 -0.0995 -0.0730
(-1.91)* (-2.87)*** (-3.45)***
Dummy Ambiguity 0.0425 0.0425 0.0425
(2.00)** (2.01)** (2.03)**
Own CE * Dummy Ambi 0.1895 0.1896 0.1858
(3.92)*** (3.92)*** (3.85)***
Own CE 0.3609 0.3697 0.5504 0.5599 0.4920 0.4920 0.3609 0.3609 0.3703
(11.03)*** (11.28)*** (17.73)*** (17.95)*** (21.88)*** (21.91)*** (8.97)*** (8.98)*** (9.23)***
Constant -0.0271 -0.1603 0.0154 -0.2523 -0.0058 -0.0271 -0.0058 -0.0271 -0.2263
(-2.23)** (-1.21) (-0.89) (-1.34) (-0.55) (-1.80)* (-0.55) (-1.82)* (-1.96)**
N 597 597 597 597 1194 1194 1194 1194 1194
Adjusted R-squared 0.1684 0.1790 0.3447 0.3527 0.2860 0.2878 0.2945 0.2963 0.3055
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Appendix G: Predicted 90 percent intervals 
 
Figure G.1: Histogram of stated certainty equivalents for the ?/?-lottery (1000,0), 
vertical lines indicate the 90 percent interval (50-800). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure G.2: Predicted 90 percent intervals for the ?/?-lottery (1000,0), 
intervals are ordered by the size of the own certainty equivalents (x-axis from low to 
high). The true 90 percent interval (50-800) is indicated by horizontal lines. 
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Figure G.3: Histogram of stated certainty equivalents for the 50/50-lottery (200,0), 
vertical lines indicate the 90 percent interval (25-150). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure G.4: Predicted 90 percent intervals for the 50/50-lottery (200,0), 
intervals are ordered by the size of the own certainty equivalents (x-axis from low to 
high). The true 90 percent interval (25-150) is indicated by horizontal lines. 
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Figure G.5: Histogram of stated certainty equivalents for the ?/?-lottery (200,0), 
vertical lines indicate the 90 percent interval (10-188). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure G.6: Predicted 90 percent intervals for the ?/?-lottery (200,0), 
intervals are ordered by the size of the own certainty equivalents (x-axis from low to 
high). The true 90 percent interval (10-188) is indicated by horizontal lines. 
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Figure G.7: Histogram of stated certainty equivalents for the 50/50-lottery (50,0), 
vertical lines indicate the 90 percent interval (10-40). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure G.8: Predicted 90 percent intervals for the 50/50-lottery (50,0), 
intervals are ordered by the size of the own certainty equivalents (x-axis from low to 
high). The true 90 percent interval (10-40) is indicated by horizontal lines. 
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Figure G.9: Histogram of stated certainty equivalents for the ?/?-lottery (50,0), 
vertical lines indicate the 90 percent interval (5-50). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure G.10: Predicted 90 percent intervals for the ?/?-lottery (50,0), 
intervals are ordered by the size of the own certainty equivalents (x-axis from low to 
high). The true 90 percent interval (5-50) is indicated by horizontal lines. 
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